When laypeople are right and experts are wrong: Lessons from love canal by Fjelland, Ragnar
 
HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, Vol. 22 (2016), 105-125. 
Copyright  2016 by HYLE and Ragnar Fjelland. 
When Laypeople are Right and Experts are 
Wrong: Lessons from Love Canal 
Ragnar Fjelland 
Abstract: Love Canal, a suburban town in New York State built on a waste 
disposal site of a former chemical factory, provoked one of the first major en-
vironmental controversies. It involved scientists, citizens and politicians, in-
cluding the US Congress and President. The controversy raises many 
important problems, and the article focuses in particular on the uses of scien-
tific knowledge and the role of scientists. Although the scientists worked for 
the authorities, they regarded their knowledge as objective and their advice as 
neutral. However, the residents of Love Canal did not trust them, and engaged 
their own scientist. At the time of the controversy (1978) the Precautionary 
Principle had not been formulated, but the controversy involved many issues 
that have later been related to the principle. One particular issue was the uses 
of statistics, and the relationship between type 1 and type 2 statistical errors. 
The article relates the controversy to recent debates on the proper use of sig-
nificance tests and statistics, and argues that context and values have to be tak-
en into consideration. It concludes that in cases like Love Canal it is 
imperative to inform about uncertainty and to involve all stakeholders.  
Keywords: environmental controversy, precautionary principle, statistics, uncer-
tainty, expert versus non-expert knowledge, ethics of science. 
1. Introduction: Why the Love Canal controversy is 
important 
Love Canal is a suburban town in the US state of New York close to Niagara 
Falls. In the summer of 1978 it became the scene of one of the first major 
environmental controversies, a controversy that hit the headlines worldwide. 
The residents complained that chemicals from a nearby chemical waste site 
caused health problems. Love Canal was in fact built over the waste disposal 
site of a former chemical factory. Nearly 22,000 tons of chemical waste (in-
cluding polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxin, and pesticides) had been deposit-
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ed. The controversy involved scientists, experts, and politicians, including the 
governor of the State of New York, the US Congress and the President.  
 There are many lessons to be learned from the case. Many of them con-
cern the relationship between the authorities, the affected citizens, and the 
general public: The importance of giving honest information and not down-
playing the hazards, and of recognizing the affected citizens as partners and 
resources, and not just as ignorant and hysterical people. Other lessons con-
cern the uses of scientific knowledge and the role of scientists. I shall in this 
article mainly concentrate on lessons we can learn from Love Canal about the 
role of science and scientists.  
 I will focus on the crucial question: Was there a causal relationship be-
tween the toxic chemicals in the waste site and health problems among the 
residents of Love Canal? To put it simply: Was Love Canal a safe place to live 
in? New York State Department of Health engaged scientists to give an an-
swer to that question. The scientists regarded it as their job to find the facts, 
and leave it to the authorities to make decisions. Although they reported to 
the authorities, they regarded themselves as objective and neutral. However, 
the residents in Love Canal did not trust them, and they themselves took an 
active part and engaged other scientists.  
 Were the scientists objective? The question does not only concern the 
objectivity of scientists, but the deeper question of objectivity itself. The 
traditional view, held by the scientists working for the Department of 
Health, was that facts should be separated from values, and that scientists 
should stick to the facts. I shall in this article show that their ideal of objec-
tivity led to bad science, and that it implicitly favored the authorities.  
 The questions raised in Love Canal are today more urgent than ever, be-
cause many of the problems contemporary science faces have similarities to 
the Love Canal case, characterized by complexity and uncertainty. 
2. The story 
The story of Love Canal began in the 1890s, when William T. Love planned 
to build a hydroelectric power plant and started the construction of a canal to 
supply water from the Niagara River. However after a section of the canal, 
which was approximately one kilometer long, twenty meters wide, and three 
meters deep, had been dug, a financial crisis forced the project to be aban-
doned. In 1905 Hooker Electrochemical Company was started near Niagara 
Falls. The factory produced, among other things, chlorine and caustic soda. 
Between 1942 and 1952 it was allowed to dispose of almost 22,000 tons of 
chemical waste in the canal, in fiber and metal barrels. In 1953 the canal was 
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full, and was covered with soil and clay, while grass grew on the surface. The 
school board of Niagara Falls then bought the land, including the canal, for 
one dollar. One condition of the deal was for a disclaimer to be included in 
the contract exempting Hooker Company from any future liability (Levine 
1982, pp. 11ff.).  
 The school was completed in 1955, with a capacity of 400 children, who 
attended every day. Houses were built around the school, most of them 
modest two- and three-bedroom houses. Although there had been some 
focus on the chemicals when the school was constructed, most of the resi-
dents were unaware of the chemicals that were buried in the ground. And 
although there were signs of leakage early on, the residents did not pay atten-
tion to them. However, things became worse in the 1970s. For example, after 
heavy rainfall odors from chemical substances became noticeable. The first 
investigation was carried out in 1976, and the suburb was visited several times 
by officials of the New York State Department of Health. However, in the 
summer of 1978, when the newspapers made the general public aware of the 
situation, the Department of Health was forced to act. In their preliminary 
investigations they found more than eighty different chemicals at the waste 
site. Ten of these substances were known to be potentially carcinogenic 
(ibid., p. 41). The director of the Department of Health declared a state of 
emergency due to the danger to public health. He justified this on the 
grounds he was convinced that the toxic chemical substances from the waste 
site represented a danger to the residents in the area. Soon after that the gov-
ernor of New York offered to buy the 239 houses situated nearest to the 
waste site and to help the residents relocate. A fence was put around the 
evacuated area. The Department of Health began an investigation into the 
health of the residents, this included blood tests, questionnaires, and an in-
quiry into the incidences of ill health among the inhabitants. Early in the Fall 
of 1978 the preliminary results of the study were made public; the health 
authorities assured the residents that the rest of Love Canal was a safe place 
to live (Paigen 1982, p. 29).  
 However, the residents distrusted the information given by the authori-
ties. They felt that the authorities regarded the residents themselves as the 
problem and suspected that information was being withheld from them. The 
residents were also never consulted during the process as key contributors of 
information (Levine 1982, p. 27). One of the residents was Lois Gibbs. She 
was a young housewife who had neither been interested in politics nor had 
taken part in any organized political activity. However, she started organizing 
her neighbors into what became Love Canal Homeowners Association 
(LCHA), and became its leader. They assisted in the investigations of the 
Department of Health, among others by calling neighbors and urging them 
to fill in forms, and by registering medical ailments. One night Gibbs decided 
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to go through all the material that had been collected. She sat down with a 
map of Love Canal and put a pin on every house that had registered medical 
problems. It appeared that the pins formed a pattern of narrow paths on the 
map. Older residents had previously informed her of large stream-beds and 
swales cutting through the area. They had been filled in when the houses 
were built. It turned out that photographs from the 1930s displayed the orig-
inal swales and stream-beds. Gibbs had the idea that there might be a connec-
tion between the pattern of the pins on the map and the swales (ibid., p. 89).  
 Because the residents did not trust the authorities, they sought outside 
assistance. Gibbs’ brother-in-law, who was a biologist at State University of 
New York/Buffalo, assisted her and encouraged her to take a leading role. 
But even more important, he alerted another scientist, Beverly Paigen, who 
was doing cancer research at a nearby research institute. She conducted re-
search on the relationship between toxics and cancer and became interested 
in the problem. At the time she tested out a hypothesis that some families 
exposed to low concentrations of toxics would be more susceptible to cancer 
than other families, and she regarded the Love Canal case as an opportunity 
to test her hypothesis.  
 Gibbs showed her map to the leader of the Department of Health’s re-
search group, but he showed little interest. Then she showed it to Beverly 
Paigen, who immediately became interested. Members of the home owners’ 
association assisted her in interviewing 1140 of the residents of Love Canal. 
The result of the investigation showed a clear geographical distribution of 
ailments, and it appeared to follow a pattern that reminded of the earlier 
swales. Paigen then divided all houses into two categories: ‘Wet homes’ were 
houses built above or close to the swales, and ‘dry homes’ were all the other 
houses. The result was striking: Women in ‘wet homes’ had three times as 
many miscarriages as women in ‘dry homes’. Birth defects, asthma, urinary 
infections and the number of psychiatric cases were several times higher in 
‘wet’ areas than in ‘dry’ areas.  
 Paigen’s investigation therefore supported Gibbs’ original hypothesis. In 
addition it had clear consequences for what should be done. One should 
evacuate residents from the ‘wet homes’ first. This was contrary to the pro-
cedure selected by the health authorities of New York. They assumed that 
the toxics spread radially from the chemical waste site. Therefore, they had 
purchased the houses closest to the waste site and evacuated the residents 
who lived there, and planned to let the rest of the residents remain.  
 There was a confrontation. When Paigen’s results were given to the press, 
the leader of the research group of the Department of Health said that the 
investigation was “totally incorrect”, and other officials later argued that the 
evidence was based on “information collected by housewives that is useless” 
(quoted from Levine 1982, p. 93).  
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 To make a long and dramatic story short: Beverly Paigen and the residents 
of Love Canal prevailed. In the summer of 1980 the Congress allocated addi-
tional funds that authorized the President to use up to 15 million US dollars 
to relocate the remaining residents. After a number of negotiations between 
different parties, Love Canal was for the most part vacated in 1981.  
3. From facts to values 
Beverly Paigen gave her version of the controversy in an article a few years 
later. She tells that she had originally believed that the case was a matter of 
scientific disagreement that could be resolved by having the involved re-
searchers come together and compare the data, experimental design, and 
statistical analyses. But she was wrong. She was surprised to discover that the 
facts made little difference, and alleged that “it raised a series of questions 
that had more to do with values than science” (Paigen 1982, p. 29). 
 There were two main differences between the research group of the De-
partment of Health and Beverly Paigen:  
 First, the research group had made the assumption that the toxics spread 
more or less homogeneously outwards from the waste site. This was in ac-
cordance with traditional scientific practice – going back to Galileo and Des-
cartes – to start with the simple and idealized. It followed from this 
assumption that the area closest to the site contained the highest concentra-
tion of toxics, and the concentration would decrease with increasing distance 
from the site. Paigen, on the other hand, had adopted Gibbs hypothesis that 
the toxics dispersed along the swales.  
 Second, they held opposite views regarding the burden of proof and the 
uses of statistics. The research group had claimed that it had used a ‘conserva-
tive’ scientific approach. Paigen says that it occurred to her that there was a 
problem when she, in a conversation with a representative from the research 
group, discovered that they disagreed about how this should be interpreted in 
every single case they discussed. They both claimed to take a conservative 
approach, but it turned out that they had opposite opinions about what ‘con-
servative’ meant in this situation. The researcher from the Department of 
Health emphasized that one must be very cautious in concluding that Love 
Canal was an unsafe place to live. Paigen, on the other hand, maintained that 
one had to be very cautious about concluding that Love Canal was a safe 
place to live. She argued that since a mistake could result in severe conse-
quences for the health of the residents, the researchers must be very careful 
in concluding that Love Canal was a safe place to live. She insisted that un-
derestimating the danger was worse than groundless fear (ibid., p. 32).  
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 Paigen’s position is described in the article that I have quoted. Her ap-
proach can be expressed in a formulation given by Nicholas Ashford, director 
of Center for Public Policy Alternatives at MIT. The question should not be 
“can you publish this in New England Journal of Medicine, but would you let 
your daughter work with that chemical?” (quoted from Savan 1988, p. 59). 
We do not have written accounts of the position of the Department of 
Health scientists, for obvious reasons. When you apply traditional scientific 
methods and carry out what you and your colleagues regard as good science, 
you normally do not state this explicitly. However, we do have some quota-
tions from conversations that support this view. Perhaps the best source is 
Adeline G. Levine’s book Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People, which has 
been my main source of information on the Love Canal case. She followed 
the case closely from the very beginning and had close contact both with 
residents, politicians and scientists who were involved in the process. Among 
others she quotes “a high-level official” who emphasized that  
[…] the health department professionals were scientists, who did not worry 
about people’s reactions to cautionary statement and recommended actions. 
They dealt with numbers – with data on physical conditions – and only with 
these. Political and social matters, the official stressed, were extraneous to the 
DOH [Department of Health] work. [Levine 1982, p. 40]  
Levine also pointed out that the scientists working for the Department of 
Health were afraid of losing their objectivity, and she quoted one scientist 
who explained objectivity in the following way: “We deal only with numbers; 
we are scientists” (quoted in Levine 1982, p. 85). 
 The positions of the Department of Health scientists and Paigen illustrate 
two of the categories introduced in Roger S. Pielke’ book The Honest Broker: 
Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (2007). The book addresses the 
relationship between scientists and political issues, and it describes different 
ways scientists may regard their own role as scientists. One category is what 
Pielke calls ‘Pure Scientists’: Their role is to sum up the state of knowledge of 
a limited area, and leave it to the politicians to make decisions. The Depart-
ment of Health scientists can no doubt be placed in this category. Two other 
categories are what Pielke calls ‘Issue Advocates’ and ‘Honest Brokers’. They 
have in common that scientists belonging to these two categories take wider 
social and political concerns into consideration. The difference is that scien-
tists belonging to the first category take sides in a controversy, and use their 
expert knowledge to pursue the political agenda that they support, whereas 
scientists belonging to the second category restrict themselves to pointing to 
the relationship between various options and political agendas. I think Paigen 
can be placed in the category of ‘Issue Advocates’, because she no doubt 
sided with the residents of Love Canal.  
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4. The Precautionary Principle: What it is and what it is 
not 
Paigen’s fundamental position – that because mistakes could result in severe 
consequences for the health of the residents, the researchers must be very 
careful in concluding that Love Canal was a safe place to live – was an applica-
tion of what has become known as the precautionary principle (PP). I will in 
this section explain the principle and in the next section look at its precondi-
tions and broader ethical and philosophical context. I will also discuss possi-
ble ethical justifications of the principle. Then I will apply it to the Love 
Canal case.  
 The account of the precautionary principle in this section follows the 
report by World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology (COMEST): The Precautionary Principle (2005). 
 The principle, explicitly formulated, is of recent origin. It originated in 
the 1970s, but today it is best known by its formulation in the Rio Declara-
tion:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation. [Rio Declaration 1992, principle 15] 
We see from the text that the term ‘approach’ is used instead of ‘principle’. 
For our purpose it makes no difference, and I will not go into further details. 
Let us take a closer look at what the principle implies.  
 The text uses the expression ‘lack of full scientific certainty’. This means 
that there must be some indications of possible damage. Ungrounded fear is 
not sufficient. It is also implied that scientific investigations have been made 
that make the assumption plausible. It is further required that the results of 
the scientific investigations are uncertain, and that this uncertainty cannot be 
reduced or eliminated before a decision is made. In the case of Love Canal 
both the research group of the Department of Health and Beverly Paigen had 
been involved, and there was indications of possible damage not only in the 
evacuated area, but in the surrounding area as well.  
 Second, the text refers to ‘serious or irreversible damage’. This is open to 
interpretation. If a person dies, it is a tragedy for that person. And in larger 
accidents, many people may die or be injured. In an airplane crash hundreds 
of people may die. Therefore, one might argue that according to the precau-
tionary principle we should ban aviation. But we do not ban all aviation be-
cause airplanes sometimes crash and people are killed. Uncertainty is a 
fundamental aspect of the human condition. However, the reduction of un-
certainty is an important aspect of modernity, and the theories of probability 
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and statistics were developed as a part of modern science, with the aim of 
reducing uncertainty. The concept of risk was a part of this endeavor. Risk 
can be defined as the probability of an adverse quantifiable outcome (there-
fore, risk is sometimes defined as the product of probability and cost of dam-
age), and risk calculations play an important part in decisions concerning 
choices of technology. On the one hand it is an acceptance of uncertainty, 
but on the other hand it is an attempt to control uncertainty (cf. the title of 
Ian Hacking’s book The Taming of Chance, 1990). 
 Third, the text uses the expression ‘cost-effective measures’. Again, this is 
open to interpretation. What is the value of good health, and what is the val-
ue of a human life, and what is the value of nature? One way of deciding the 
value of a harm is the compensation that is paid to the victims, or if the dam-
age is reversible, the cost of cleaning up or repairing the damage. In many 
cases prevention is more cost-effective than cure, and therefore precaution is 
cost-effective. If precaution had been taken from the very beginning, the 
authorities would not have allowed the chemical waste to be buried in Love 
Canal, and if that had already been done, they would not have allowed the 
school and the suburb to be built on top of the waste site. However, this 
could not be undone. As the situation was now, the costs of cleaning up the 
place, or buying the houses of the residents and aiding them in relocating, 
paying medical bills, etc. would far exceed the costs of safely depositing the 
chemical waste in the first place. However, the problem is often that benefits 
and costs are not equally distributed. In Love Canal Hooker Electrochemical 
Company had got rid of the chemical waste in the cheapest possible way, and 
sold the land for one dollar on the condition that they should be exempt 
from any liability. 
 It was argued that even if Hooker did not have a legal obligation, it at 
least had a moral obligation. This was denied by the company. In the end the 
US Congress paid the costs because this had been a political issue. However, 
to decide in each case what ‘cost-effctive measures’ implies, is far from easy.  
5. The Precautionary Principle: Broader context and 
justification 
How can the precautionary principle be justified? I shall not try to give a 
complete justification, but restrict myself to elaborating some of the philo-
sophical and ethical background that makes the principle plausible.  
 The precautionary principle may be regarded as a result of a change of 
scientific paradigm. Newton completed the scientific revolution that started 
with Galileo, and he made classical mechanics the model of all science. Be-
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cause classical mechanics is deterministic, they established an ideal of exact 
predictions that was unprecedented. Using the laws of classical mechanics the 
motion of celestial bodies could be calculated thousands of years into the 
past and the future. However, at the end of the nineteenth century the math-
ematician Henri Poincaré showed that even a deterministic system may be-
come unstable, making calculations difficult. In 1960 Edward Lorenz, who 
worked on a simplified weather model, showed that even in a simple deter-
ministic system small errors may obstruct exact predictions (sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions, known as the ‘butterfly effect’). His 
conclusion was that long-time weather forecasts are generally impossible. It 
was gradually acknowledged that the ideal of classical mechanics only applied 
to simple, idealized systems. Most natural systems are complex, and therefore 
uncertainty will in many cases be irreducible. The recognition that nature is 
complex and that uncertainty normally cannot be eliminated is an important 
precondition for the precautionary principle.  
 Another precondition is the recognition that nature is limited and vulner-
able. To some extent this recognition represents a return to a view of nature 
that was dominating prior to the scientific revolution of the 17th century. The 
dominating view of nature from Antiquity through the Middle Ages was to 
regard nature as analogous to an organism (an organismic view), where man 
was regarded as a part of nature. However, this changed in the 17th  century. 
The organismic view of nature was replaced by a mechanistic view, regarding 
nature as a big machine. The clockwork metaphor became important. Instead 
of regarding nature as our home, it was rather regarded as a resource that 
could be exploited for our benefits.  
 If we jump to our recent history, a highly influential book was Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring. She brought the public attention to the widespread 
destruction of wildlife in America by the use of pesticides including insecti-
cides. When the book was published in 1962, Carson was heavily attacked by 
the agricultural chemical industry and the scientific establishment. Question-
ing the benefits of the new pesticides was regarded as attacking the faith in 
scientific progress. However, president John F. Kennedy was so impressed by 
the book that he ordered the President’s Science Advisory Committee to 
investigate the uses of pesticides in agriculture. When the committee pub-
lished its report in 1963, it confirmed that Carson was basically right.  
 Carson’s book was not only an attack on the uses of pesticides, but on a 
scientific and technological development that regarded nature as only a re-
source to be exploited by us. Although the process has been slow, it is today 
recognized that nature is both limited and complex.  
 Another factor is the recognition that we have a responsibility for nature 
and future generations. I will restrict myself to mentioning one influential 
book, by the German philosopher Hans Jonas. The book was first published 
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in 1979 in German under the title Das Prinzip Verantwortung (The Principle 
of Responsibility) and in English as The Imperative of Responsibility in 1984. 
As the original title indicates, Jonas made responsibility the very foundation 
of ethics, in opposition to the traditional view that to be a subject of ethics 
we require autonomy. His point of departure was that all ethical theories up 
until then had taken as frame of reference that all consequences of human 
actions are small in ‘space and time’. However, the tremendous power of 
modern science and technology has changed this. The atomic bomb is the 
most dramatic example. A nuclear war will not only affect all people alive 
today, but future generations as well. It may even eradicate all life. Jonas 
therefore set out to develop the foundation of a global ethics, based on re-
sponsibility as the fundamental concept.  
 Responsibility is an asymmetrical concept: A may be responsible for B 
without B being responsible for A. For example, the parents are responsible 
for their children, but the children are not responsible for their parents. 
(When the children grow up and their parents are old, the relationship chang-
es. But that is a different matter.) Therefore, the argument that we should 
not do anything for future generations because they have not done anything 
for us, is invalid. We may have responsibility for animals, future generations, 
and nature even if they do not have responsibility for us. Jonas was particu-
larly concerned that we should not destroy the conditions of life for future 
generations. He even formulated a categorical imperative to replace Kant’s 
categorical imperative. Like Kant he gave several formulations of his impera-
tive. One of them is this: “Act so that the effects of your action are con-
sistent with a continuing genuine life on earth.” (Jonas 1984, p. 11)  
 At last I want to mention the article ‘Asymmetries in Ethics’, written by 
the Norwegian philosopher Knut-Erik Tranøy in 1967. It was written before 
the precautionary principle became a topic, and has hardly had any influence 
on the development of the principle. Nevertheless, in the article he intro-
duced some important concepts that can be used to justify the principle. The 
article was inspired by the philosopher of science Karl Popper and his asym-
metry between verification and falsification: Because scientific statements 
according to Popper are universal statements, they can never be verified. 
However, they can be definitely falsified. His favorite example was the 
statement: ‘All swans are white.’ Observation of thousands of white swans 
cannot verify the statement, but only one black swan can falsify it. Tranøy 
applies this asymmetry to some fundamental ethical concepts, like life and 
death, pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, right and wrong, and 
good and bad. According to Tranøy these pairs of concepts are asymmetric, 
similar to verification and falsification in the sense that the negative terms are 
more definitive, categorical, and fundamental than the positive.  
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 His first example is the asymmetry between life and death. We know 
numerous sufficient conditions for death, but whereas we know many neces-
sary conditions for life, we do not know any sufficient conditions. Similarly, 
there are numerous ways of killing people, but to keep them alive, grow, and 
flourish is much more indefinite and vague. Therefore, it is easier to find a 
negative formulation, for example ‘you shall not kill’, than a positive. Alt-
hough he does not deal with the pair utility/harm, it is obvious that the same 
asymmetry applies to this pair as well. Therefore, it follows that it is more 
important to prevent harm than to promote utility. This is a kind of ‘negative 
utilitarianism’ that can be used to justify the precautionary principle.  
 One might apply Tranøy’s asymmetry directly to the Love Canal case. 
Utility would be the money saved if nothing was done. This money could be 
used for other purposes, and would increase the total utility in the New York 
State or in the country as a whole (depending on who actually supplied the 
money, New York State or US government). The harm would be possible 
health problems among the citizens of Love Canal. Of course, many good 
things might be done with the money saved, for example building new 
schools, or nursing homes for elderly people. But the money might also be 
wasted, on badly planned projects, corruption, or on an increasing bureaucra-
cy. Although some uncertainty was involved, the harm to the citizens was 
rather concrete, causing severe health problems. Of course, uncertainty com-
plicates the problem. Let us, therefore, return to the question of uncertainty. 
6. The precautionary principle and statistics 
Although the precautionary principle was not formulated at the time of the 
Love Canal controversy, it is interesting to see how it applies to that case.  
 There was general agreement that the inner, evacuated area was not safe. 
But what about the remaining part of Love Canal? The researchers working 
for the Department of Health concluded that it was safe, and their main ar-
gument was that the frequency of health problems, for example miscarriages, 
was not significantly higher than in comparable areas. Therefore, there was 
no causal relationship between the toxics at the waste site and health prob-
lems in the population of Love Canal (except the inner area that had already 
been evacuated).  
 One of the standard methods for establishing causal relationships is the 
use of significance tests. We compare one group which has been exposed to 
the alleged cause (the experimental group) with a similar group which has not 
been exposed to the same cause (control group). If we observe a difference in 
the two groups, we infer that it is due to the alleged cause. However, this 
116 Ragnar Fjelland 
 
inference is only valid if we know that the two groups prior to the exposure 
to the alleged cause are similar (in all relevant aspects). Therefore laboratory 
conditions are preferred, because one can control the environment. But even 
under laboratory conditions it is impossible to control all factors. In particu-
lar, in all biological systems there is variation. One technique is to try to dis-
tribute the unknown factors equally in the experimental and the control 
group (randomization). However, all uncertainty cannot be eliminated, and 
outside the laboratory we have much less control.  
 Therefore, when we observe a difference between the experimental group 
and the control group, the difference may be a sign of a causal relationship, 
but it may also be due to factors beyond our control, or due to chance. But 
how do we know if it is the one or the other? One standard procedure is 
using a ‘null hypothesis’: We assume that the observed difference between 
the two groups has come about by chance. Only if the probability of this 
happening is lower than a certain level, called the significance level, will we 
reject the null hypothesis. A significance level of 0.05 (5%) is normally used. 
That means that only if the probability of the difference occurring by chance 
is less than 5%, will we conclude that the difference is not likely due to 
chance and that therefore we should seek another explanation – for example 
that the relationship is in fact causal.  
7. Type I and type II statistical errors 
We may make two kinds of error due to the statistical nature of a problem: A 
type I error is rejecting a null hypothesis when it is in fact true. This is equiv-
alent to claiming that there is an effect that in reality does not exist (‘false 
positive’). A type II error is failing to reject a null hypothesis that is in fact 
false. This is equivalent to overlooking an effect that really exists (‘false nega-
tive’).  
 Although the relationship between a type I and a type II error depends on 
the specific problem, in general there is a trade-off between them: If we de-
crease the probability of one, the probability of the other increases. In tradi-
tional significance tests the probability of a type I error is controlled (it is set 
by the significance level), thus leaving the probability of a type II error open. 
If researchers inform us that they have not found a statistically significant 
difference, it would be important additional information if the probability of 
overlooking the difference is large. In statistics text books it is therefore 
emphasized that the probability for a type II error should always be evaluat-
ed. However in practice this is different. We know that this rule is often vio-
lated.  
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 One may ask why a type I error is worse than a type II error. One sensi-
ble answer is that scientists should have good evidence for asserting some-
thing, and when they have not, they should refrain from asserting. It is 
therefore more detrimental to their reputation to assert something that is not 
the case than overlooking something that is the case. Sometimes a legal anal-
ogy is used to justify the asymmetry. In a criminal case the jury sticks to the 
‘null hypothesis’ of not guilty until the defendant is proved guilty. The bur-
den of proof is on the prosecutor. The justification is that it is worse to find 
an innocent person guilty than failing to convict a guilty person (Bhatta-
charyya & Johnson 1977, p. 168).  
 To put the burden of proof on the one who asserts that there is a differ-
ence may make sense in basic science, but it turns out differently when used 
in applied science. (I shall later show that it does not make sense in basic 
science, either.) Engineers have treated type I and type II errors differently, 
because they know that their information is used to make decisions. Type I 
error is called ‘producer risk’ because a false positive may harm the producer: 
He may have to withdraw a product that is not really harmful, or pay com-
pensation for a non-existing harm. Type II error is called ‘consumer risk’ 
because failing to detect a harmful effect harms the consumer. The traditional 
approach of minimizing type I error favors the producer and puts the burden 
of proof on the consumer or victim of pollution. For example, in environ-
mental questions it is often the case that those affected by the pollution have 
the burden of proof, while those who pollute have the benefit of doubt. 
When Beverly Paigen and the residents of Love Canal claimed that the toxic 
substances from the dump site were the cause of illness, they had the burden 
of proof.  
 The scientists working for the Department of Health certainly knew who 
had hired them. One might suspect that they wanted to come up with results 
that favored their employer. This may often be the case. As a member of the 
Norwegian Research Ethics Committee for Science and Technology in the 
1990s I attended meetings with researchers who confessed that they had 
conscientious problems because they knew that if they did not produce the 
results their contractor expected, future projects would be endangered. 
Needless to say, these confessions made a deep impression on the members 
of the committee. However, in Love Canal the scientists might just stick to 
traditional scientific methods, allegedly being objective and neutral. There-
fore, insisting on this kind of method favors one part of the conflict, the 
‘producer’ (or the one who is responsible for the harm).  
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8. Reversing the burden of proof 
The Department of Health’s research group claimed to do good science, 
whereas Paigen was regarded as mixing her personal feelings or political 
agenda into her scientific activity. As we have seen, she used precaution to 
justify her approach. Today we would just have referred to the precautionary 
principle to support her claims about the burden of proof, and one might 
argue that asymmetry between type I and type II errors should be reversed. 
In cases like Love Canal, where possible harm is imminent, it is certainly 
better to overestimate the danger than to underestimate it. The philosopher 
Kristin Shrader-Frechette argued in favor of this position as early as 1991 in 
her book Risk and Rationality (Shrader-Frechette 1991, Lemons et al. 1997).  
 However, Paigen might have taken a more assertive approach. Instead of 
defending herself, she might have accused the researchers of the Department 
of Health of doing bad science. To see how, we only have to ask the simple 
question about significance tests: Why do we use a significance level of 
p = 0.05 (or even p = 0.01)? The simple answer is that it represents a differ-
ence of two (or three, respectively) standard deviations from the mean if we 
assume a normal distribution. However, why two standard deviations? It is 
no more than a rule of thumb. It can be traced back to Ronald Fisher’s The 
Design of Experiments (1935), where it looks as if only significant results 
according to this rule are acceptable. The problem is that Fisher neglected 
advice from all the other leading statisticians of his time. His simplified ver-
sion prevailed, though, and became the leading orthodoxy until today. But it 
has drawn increasing criticism during the last decade. (For the historical 
background and criticism of traditional significance tests, see Ziliak & 
McCloskey 2012.) 
 I said previously that a possible justification for minimizing type I errors 
in basic science was that it is more detrimental to a scientist’s reputation to 
assert something that is not the case than failing to detect something that is 
the case. This may be true as a factual description, but it is nevertheless bad 
science. As Karl Popper pointed out long ago, good science is not character-
ized by advancing modest hypotheses, but by advancing bold hypotheses. This 
kind of precaution is not a scientific virtue. However, when hypotheses have 
been advanced, they should be subject to severe tests. Indeed, we shall try to 
falsify them. If they survive the tests, we should keep them. But only tempo-
rarily, because hypotheses can never be verified. However, they can be defi-
nitely falsified, and will then be replaced by better hypotheses. We do not 
have to subscribe to all of Popper’s philosophy of science to endorse his view 
that creativity and boldness are imperative to scientific progress (see for ex-
ample Popper 1981, p. 96.) We only have to keep in mind the importance of 
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originality in scientific work. This is why plagiarism is regarded as one of the 
most serious kinds of scientific misconduct.  
 Many researchers have criticized significance testing. In 2005 the statisti-
cian John Ioannidis published the article ‘Why Most Published Research 
Findings Are False’. The article focuses on the relationship between type I 
and type II errors. He uses typical values from research fields (for example, 
in some fields the probability of a type II error may be up to 0.5, which im-
plies that there is a 50% chance of failing to observe a real effect), and some 
simple calculations to underpin his conclusion: “It can be proven that most 
claimed research findings are false.” (Ioannidis 2005)  
 This year the American Statistical Association (ASA) issued a statement 
concerning the uses of significance tests. The conclusion is worth quoting:  
Let’s be clear. Nothing in the ASA statement is new. Statisticians and others 
have been sounding the alarm about these matters for decades, to little avail. 
We hoped that a statement from the world’s largest professional association of 
statisticians would open a fresh discussion and draw renewed and vigorous at-
tention to changing the practice of science with regards to the use of statistical 
inference. [Wasserstein & Lazar 2016]  
9. Uncertainty and ignorance 
It is important to bear in mind that the significance level is more or less arbi-
trary, while it would make more sense if it was estimated in each concrete 
case. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that significance tests only 
concerns random errors, due to chance. In most situations systematic errors 
are much more important: experimental errors, measurements errors, sam-
pling bias, wrong models. etc. Love Canal gives a good illustration of this.  
 All these factors are sources of uncertainty that is much more serious 
than the risk due to random statistical variation. At least we must make a 
distinction between three different kinds of uncertainty:  
1. Risk: This is the kind of uncertainty that we deal with in probability theo-
ry and statistics. We know possible outcomes, and we know the probabili-
ties of various outcomes. 
2. Uncertainty (‘known unknowns’): In this case we know the possible out-
come, but we cannot assign probabilities to them.  
3. Ignorance (‘unknown unknowns’): In this case we do not even know the 
possible outcomes and so we cannot estimate their probabilities. 
We have seen that the research group of the Department of Health used a 
model where they assumed that toxics spread homogeneously outwards from 
the waste site. They expected to find the highest concentrations of both tox-
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ins and health problems in the houses closest to the site, and decreasing out-
wards. However, this was not confirmed. They also took the total population 
in Love Canal outside the evacuated area and compared it to a similar popula-
tion. They did not find any significant difference, and this supported their 
view that the rest of Love Canal was a safe place to live.  
 This conclusion was, however, based on an erroneous model. The assump-
tion that the toxics spread homogeneously outward from the waste site was 
wrong, and the hypothesis that it followed the swales, was right. Therefore, 
they did not see significant differences. However, when Paigen divided the 
homes into ‘wet’ and ‘dry’, she had no problems in establishing significant 
differences (for example in the number of miscarriages). An important lesson 
from Love Canal is, therefore, that statistics does not help if one uses a 
wrong model.  
 This is an example of ignorance: What actually happened, was not part of 
the models applied by the scientists.  
10. When the model is wrong 
Experts trained in a field have a tendency to apply the kinds of models that 
conform with their field. The following example has been taken from Brian 
Wynne’s ‘Uncertainty and Environmental Learning’ (1992): In May of 1986 a 
cloud of radioactive material from the Chernobyl accident passed over Cum-
bria in North Wales. Heavy rains caused a large amount of radioactive cesium 
to fall over an area used to raise sheep. The authorities in charge assured eve-
ryone that there was no cause for concern, but in spite of this, six weeks after 
the rains a ban against selling meat from sheep that had grazed in the area was 
imposed because of the high levels of radioactivity found in the meat. Experts 
claimed however that the radioactivity would rapidly decrease, and that the 
ban would be lifted in a few weeks. Yet, even after six years the level of radio-
activity was so high in some of the affected areas that restrictions had to be 
upheld. 
 How could the experts be so wrong? Their predictions were based on 
extrapolations from the behavior of cesium in alkaline clay soil to the acid 
peat soil of Cumbria. Measurements showed that the dispersion of cesium in 
these types of soil was fairly similar, and on that basis they assumed that 
cesium would sink so far down into the ground that after a short period of 
time there would be no problem. This was based on the assumption that the 
radiation would come from the cesium in the soil and would be absorbed by 
people or animals who happened to be in the area. Under this assumption it 
was the physical transport of cesium in the soil that was important. However, 
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this assumption was wrong. The sheep received cesium in their bodies 
through the grass they ate. The important question was therefore not how 
the cesium was dispersed throughout the soil but if it was absorbed into the 
vegetation. Here there proved to be a significant difference between alkaline 
clay soil and acid peat. In alkaline clay soil, cesium adsorbs on aluminum 
silicate so that it cannot move into the vegetation, whereas in peat it remains 
chemically mobile and can therefore be taken up by the vegetation. The ex-
perts did not consider these possibilities, and that was the cause of their mis-
taken predictions (Wynne 1992, 121). 
 Should not a model that takes into consideration for example chemical 
properties, have been used at the onset? The answer is, of course, yes. But to 
understand why the experts made such an apparently elementary error we 
have to take into consideration that they had been trained as physicists. Phys-
icists are used to think in terms of physical transportation and radiation. 
Chemists are trained to think in terms of chemical reactions and chemical 
mobility. The problem is that it is not a part of professional training to learn 
about the limits of the models and methods of a field. 
 A serious obstacle to coming to terms with this problem is the fact that 
Thomas Kuhn’s description of the scientific community is to a large extent 
valid. We do not have to accept the more controversial parts of Kuhn’s theo-
ry in order to agree that scientists are trained within a ‘paradigm’. Parts of the 
paradigm will be the tacit knowledge which is imperative to everyday scien-
tific work. This kind of knowledge cannot be articulated as explicit rules. 
Kuhn himself uses Michael Polanyi’s term “tacit knowledge” (Kuhn 1970, p. 
187). When experts deal with situations which fit into their paradigm, this 
works fine. But when confronted with situations that are not so easy to ac-
commodate to the expert’s paradigm, it is a source of error. Because experts 
in the same field are trained within the same paradigm, they are usually blind 
to many of their own tacit assumptions. However, experts from other fields 
may immediately be aware of some of the tacit assumptions of the field. 
Therefore, in cases involving complexity and uncertainty it is imperative to 
draw on various kinds of expertise. 
11. Conclusion: Lessons 
First lesson: Scientists are not outside 
In this article I have presented two opposite views of scientific objectivity 
and the scientists’ role in giving policy advice in cases where there are differ-
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ent interests involved. On the one hand the scientists working for the De-
partment of Health argued that their role as scientists required that they 
produce objective knowledge, independent of who might benefit and who 
might lose from this information. They acted as ‘Pure Scientists’ according to 
Pielke’s terminology. On the other hand, Beverly Paigen argued that scien-
tists should choose sides, and she applied what is today known as the precau-
tionary principle. She acted as an ‘Issue Advocate’ in Pielke’ terminology.  
 As pointed out earlier, the researchers of the Department of Health were 
victims of an erroneous idea of scientific objectivity. This prevented them 
from cooperating with the residents of Love Canal. If they had entered into a 
dialogue with the residents, they would have learned about the swales. Lois 
Gibbs learned about the swales from older residents. When systems are com-
plex, local knowledge may be more useful than mathematical models. The 
result of this alleged objectivity and neutrality was that the researchers sided 
with one party, the authorities. 
 Should the Department of Health researchers have sided with the resi-
dents of Love Canal, like Beverly Paigen? That was not required. However, 
they should have taken the residents seriously, and cooperated with them. 
The result would have been better science, and better science advice. The first 
lesson from Love Canal is that scientists must not remain outside a contro-
versy.  
Second lesson: Inform about uncertainty  
We have seen that statistics was an issue in the Love Canal case. However, I 
have argued that other kinds of uncertainty are much more important. The 
following example applies to all kinds of uncertainty.  
 Let us imagine that a group of researchers is assigned the task of examin-
ing whether there is a difference in the incidence of illness between two 
groups, and they give the answer T0: ‘We have not found any (statistically 
significant) difference.’ However for the decision maker essential infor-
mation is missing, because the answer may be interpreted in two different 
ways. Either T1: ‘We have not found any difference, and we most likely 
would have found it if it existed’ or T2: ‘We have not found any difference, 
but we most likely would not have found it even if it existed.’ Needless to 
say, T0 would carry much more weight if the correct interpretation was T1 
than if it was T2. Therefore, it is a serious problem when researchers answer 
T0, the majority of politicians and others interpret it as T1, and the correct 
interpretation is T2. This was probably the case in Love Canal.  
 Even if the scientists of Department of Health regarded themselves as 
belonging to Pielke’s category of ‘Pure Scientists’, not informing about un-
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certainty would not only be bad science advice, but bad science. However, it 
may have serious implications when decisions are based on scientific advice.  
Third lesson: Laypeople should be involved 
In their book Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy (1990) Jerome 
Ravetz and Silvio Funtowicz argue that science has to enter into a ‘post-
normal’ phase to adequately address problems where uncertainty and ‘deci-
sion stakes’ are high. In the book they develop a conceptual scheme to deal 
with the new challenges. I shall not go into technical details, but will just 
mention one aspect of ‘post-normal’ science which is relevant to my discus-
sion: the uses of what they call ‘extended peer communities’. 
 ‘Extended peer communities’ imply an extension of the traditional scien-
tific community to include non-experts as well. However, this does not mean 
that laypeople should invade the research laboratories and carry out research. 
It does mean, though, that laypeople should take part in discussions of priori-
ties, evaluation of results, and policy debates.  
 One reason for including non-experts is that they are sometimes closer to 
the problem. In Love Canal we saw that the residents had local knowledge 
that the scientists could not possibly have. Lois Gibbs did not have any rele-
vant formal education, she was not trained in the uses of mathematical mod-
els and statistics. However, when she sat down with a map of Love Canal and 
put pins on every home that had reported health problems, she saw that they 
formed a pattern, and had the idea that the health problems might be con-
nected with the swales that cut through the area. She thus made a contribu-
tion that was much more important than any of the scientists of the 
Department of Health. When problems are complex, local knowledge is at 
least as important as mathematical models.  
 The contribution from laypeople may also be valuable for the opposite 
reason. In Love Canal the contribution of the residents was valuable because 
of their closeness to the problems, but laypeople may also be valuable be-
cause they have a distance. Experts are often caught in their models, they are 
victims of ‘tunnel vision’. One way of revealing experts’ hidden assumptions 
is to ask apparently stupid questions, which may be regarded as an extension 
of an important element in the Socratic tradition in philosophy. We know 
that it was part of Socrates’ strategy to pretend that he was more ignorant 
than he actually was. For example, in the dialogue Gorgias he asks the expert 
in rhetoric, the Sophist Gorgias, what rhetoric is. He then shows that Gorgi-
as’ answer is insufficient, and proceeds to ‘deeper’ or ‘wider’ questions. Very 
often the dialogue ends up with the fundamental ethical questions of the 
right, the good, and justice.  
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 An ethical reason for bringing in common people is that they are affected 
by the decisions which are made. The questions of global warming, the ozone 
layer, radioactive waste, and genetically modified food concerns everybody, 
experts as well as non-experts. These questions are too important to be left 
only to the experts.  
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Further reading 
The most comprehensive account of the controversy is Levine 1982. A huge 
collection of original documents concerning the Love Canal case are available 
at http://library.buffalo.edu/specialcollections/lovecanal/collections/ (ac-
cessed 30 March 2016). There is a website for the precautionary principle: 
http://www.precautionaryprinciple.eu/ (accessed 30 March 2016). From this 
website you can download among others COMEST 2005. A critical history 
of significance tests can be found in Ziliak & McCloskey 2012. Many exam-
ples of the abuse of mathematical models, in particular in geology, are given 
in Pilkey & Pilkey-Jarvis 2007. Two recent collections of relevant articles are 
Pereira & Funtowicz 2015 and Meisch et al. 2015. 
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